An important component of the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision's framework of capital measurement and capital standards is the public disclosure of regulatory information (referred to as "Pillar 3" within the framework). The standard sets minimum requirements for the public disclosure of information on banks' risk profile, risk management, capital adequacy, capital instruments and remuneration practices so as to contribute to the transparency of financial markets and to enhance market discipline. We find that capital and risk reporting to the market under Pillar 3 of the Basel II and Basel III accords alters the informational advantage of bank equity analysts. After the commencement of Pillar 3 reporting in Australia, equity research analysts seem to have gained access to value relevant information that was hitherto only the preserve of banks and regulators. We also find that forecast accuracy improves. However, market reaction to forecasts diminishes.
The Basel Committee on Banking Supervision's framework of capital measurement and capital standards now requires the public disclosure of regulatory information (referred to as "Pillar 3" within the Basel II and Basel III frameworks). 1 The standard sets minimum requirements for the public disclosure of information on banks' risk profile, risk management, capital adequacy, capital instruments and remuneration practices so as to contribute to the transparency of financial markets and to enhance market discipline.
Pillar 3 is about providing public access to regulatory data for all banks, which is complementary to accounting-based information that has been traditionally made public by banks (Boreo, 2004) . The introduction of this requirement means that in countries that have adopted the standard, such as Australia starting November 2008, information that would ordinarily be shared between banks and regulators is now available to financial markets.
The natural question that flows from this development is how has Pillar 3 reporting shaped the information environment for banking stocks? Traditionally, banks have reported financial statements to the public and regulatory filings only to regulators.
Pillar 3 reporting puts capital and risk statements into the public domain for the first time.
Investors and depositors now have timely access to information that only regulators were privy to. In this paper, we assess the impact of this change on the banks' financial information environment by examining how the change has affected the performance of equity analysts that follow bank stocks.
Our hypothesis is that the informativeness of analyst research is improved postPillar 3 reporting. We argue that prior to Pillar 3, analysts had limited ability to incorporate in their outputs capital and risk information that was not in the public domain. By needing to research banks 'privately' in this way, analyst products such as 1 In Australia these requirements are outlined in APRA Prudential Standard APS 330 Public Disclosure (APS 330).
research reports, stock recommendations and earnings forecasts contained information that investors would regard as novel and, therefore, informative. If this hypothesis holds, we should expect the informativeness of analyst research to increase after the adoption of Pillar 3 reporting. Thus, there is an increase in the market's reaction to the research and the accuracy of analysts' predictions.
The counterfactual, or null, hypothesis, is that Pillar 3 reporting the provision to the market of more value relevant information that was previously restricted to regulators diminishes the role of equity research. While prior to Pillar 3 reporting analysts played an important role in finding this information, creating additional analysis, and then presenting it to the public, bank equity analysts' research is now less value-relevant.
As such, the stock price relevance and accuracy of analyst predictions are reduced.
There are other factors that may work against us finding evidence in line with our main hypothesis, chief of which is the lack of interest in Pillar 3 reports. According to the Our results may be summarized as follows. We find that the overall informativeness of recommendations has significantly decreased following the regulations: The absolute price reactions to stock recommendations are significantly lower in the Post-Reg period. This holds after controlling for changes in market volatility, analyst experience, past market and firm performance, and changes in sample composition across the two periods. We further show that recommendations issued by brokers who use a three-tier rating system (before or after the regulations) provide less information to investors. Additionally, the decline in informativeness after the regulations is stronger for sanctioned banks, all of whom have switched to a three-tier system. These results are consistent with a causal effect of the regulations on the informativeness of stock recommendations.
The remainder of this article is arranged as follows. The next section reviews the literature and introduces the institutional arrangements around Pillar 3 reporting. Section 2 describes our data sources, key variables and summary statistics. Section 3 provides the results of our empirical analysis, while Section 4 concludes the paper.
Literature Review and Institutional Background
The underlying premise of this paper is that market discipline actually works. Our first step in reviewing the literature is therefore to identify whether market discipline has been shown to work at all. According to Flannery (2001) market discipline has two dimensions: market monitoring and market influence. In the first dimension investors evaluate the condition of a firm, and then reflect the assessment in traded security prices or rates of borrowing. The second dimension refers to the reaction of the firm (for example, attenuating risk exposures) in response to the changes in security prices or borrowing rates.
Our paper is in the spirit of Flannery's (2001) first dimension of market discipline.
We argue that if the effects of Pillar 3 reporting cannot be traced to information intermediaries such as equity analysts, then there is little basis to expect market monitoring to work. Likely the second dimension of market disciple would be compromised as well.
The current study fits into the literature providing empirical evidence on the existence of market, for example with respect to (1) price discipline (e.g. Hannan, Hanweck, 1988, and Ellis, Flannery, 1992 and quantity discipline (Jordan, 2000, and [Goldberg, Hudgins, 1996) in retail and corporate deposits. The literature also shows evidence of market discipline with regard to stock prices (e.g. Brewer and Lee, 1986, and Distinguin et al., 2006) and debt prices (eg. Goyal, 2005, and Ashcraft, 2008) . To the best of our knowledge, ours is the first paper to trace the market discipline provisions of the Basel II and III accords to the informativeness of equity analysts' output.
The effects of market discipline on bank actions (Flaneery's (2001) second dimension) has also been investigated in the interbank market (e.g. Nier, 2006 , Dinger and von Hagen, 2009 , and Liedorp et al., 2010 . However, the literature comes to different conclusions. For example, Nier, 2006, Dinger and von Hagen, 2009 find market discipline is found to be effective in reducing banks' risk. However, Liedorp et al. (2010) find the opposite result, pointing instead to the presence of a contagion effect.
Overall, the impact of mandatory public disclosure of regulatory capital and risk information has received little attention in the literature. Sabiwaltsky (2012) This attribute also features in Merton's (1978) model, in which the frequency of bank examinations could be substituted for more stringent capital requirements. However, Rochet (2004) argues that "the introduction of Pillar 3 (market discipline) changes the picture: the intensity of regulation can be modulated according to market information … and symmetrically, supervisors can be forced to intervene when market signals reveal the distress of a bank (so that forbearance becomes more costly to supervisors or politicians).
Notice also that market discipline decreases the (ex-post) benefits of forbearance by We obtain data on analysts' research reports on the eight banks from the Thomson Reuters database, ThomsonOne. We restrict the reports to those produced by professional equity research firms. This restriction is necessary for us to concentrate on reports that are most likely to be used by investors for actual decision-making.
ThomsonOne provides the release dates, and identities of the research firms and banks included in the reports.
We also extract an indicator of whether the analyst producing the report has a Starmine rating, which we label RATING. StarMine measures the overall accuracy of an analyst's earnings estimates according to a metric known as the Overall Estimate Score, which reflects the aggregation of all the analyst's Single-stock Estimate Scores ("SES").
The analysis begins at the level of a single stock with our Single-stock Estimate Score ("SES"). SES is a relative measure; it compares an analyst's performance with that of his or her peers on a single stock. SES ranges from 0 to 100, with 50 representing average performance. To get a score higher than 50, an analyst must make estimates that are both significantly different from, and more accurate than, other analysts' estimates. We use this designation to control for the fact that there are some reports that investors are more likely to rely on in decision making than others. Analysts without a rating represent those with insufficient/unavailable analyst data and we conjecture their reports have lower visibility to investors.
Variable Construction
We now turn to our construction of variables for this study, starting with the dependent variables. We measure the information content of analysts' stock recommendations as the thirty-day market-adjusted buy and hold profit (PFT) on the relevant stock following publication of the recommendation. We use the ASX 200
Accumulation Index to represent the market. Similarly, we measure PFT on analysts forecasts and research reports.
Following the literature (e.g. Agrawal, Chadha and Chen (2006), we define the normalized forecast error for analyst i following bank j for forecast period t as follows:
( 1) where e jt equals the EPS for bank j for year t, i jt equals the latest ê estimate of e jt by analyst firm i during a given forecast period, and p jt equals the latest available stock price preceding the forecast period. period for 61 percent of the observations. The mean age of the forecasts in the sample is 158 days, corresponding to the natural log of one plus the age (LNAGE) of 5.06. EPS declines relative to the previous year (DECLINE = 1) in about 37 percent of the cases.
Descriptive Statistics
The mean change in EPS relative to the previous year (SHOCK) is about 1.5 percent.
Starmine ratings exist for 48 percent (RATING = 1) of the analysts who publish research reports on our eight banks. About 51 percent of the analyst report observations occur in the Pillar 3 reporting period.
There is no immediately distinguishable pattern in absolute stock returns post the publication of analyst stock recommendations, earnings forecasts, or research reports.
On average, the stock price change following publication of analyst research (recommendations, earnings forecasts and reports) on our sample of banks translates into a market adjusted return of approximately 5 percent in the post-publication month.
The closeness of this metric across the three types of research outputs calls for further preliminary investigation. In Figure 1 we observe pictorially that there is a correlation in the timing of the release dates for the three types of analyst research. This raises the possibility that our Profit measures are also highly correlated, since they follow correlated timing in the distribution of the research.
We provide direct statistical evidence related to this issue in (Ohlson 1995; Frankel and Lee 1998) . There is also a zero correlation between research reports and recommendations.
Empirical results
Our first two hypotheses are that, with the adoption of Pillar 3 reporting, the value relevance of analysts' outputs (buy-sell recommendations and earnings forecasts) is diminished because hitherto hidden capital and risk information is now in the public domain and no longer the preserve of a subset of skilled or privately informed analysts.
The third hypothesis is that once bank capital and risk information is made publicly available, the dispersion of analysts' forecasts should diminish as such wide availability of the regulatory data levels the playing ground between analysts. Sections 3.1 presents the results of fixed effects regressions on the informativeness of analyst stock recommendations in the pre-and post Pillar 3 periods. Section 3.2 examines analyst forecasts and their accuracy. Section 3.4 addresses the information content of research reports.
Before we implement methods that control for other factors that may affect the information content of different types of analyst research output, it is useful to present the results of a simple "before versus after" comparison. Table 3 presents the results of preliminary univariate tests for analyst research informativeness. It would appear there is no statistically discernible change in the information content of research reports in the Pillar 3 reporting era. However, there are significant falls in the profitability of recommendations and earnings forecasts. Meanwhile, the accuracy of forecasts improves markedly as evidenced the fall in NFE. Although these patterns begin to speak to the validity of our hypotheses, we need to subject them to more rigorous multivariate testsour next task below.
Informativeness of analyst recommendations
We explore whether the information content of analyst recommendations changes in the period after the adoption of Pillar 3 reporting by the banks in our sample.
We need to control for other factors that might affect the profitability of analyst recommendations such as the direction of the recommendations. In order to control for these influences, we estimate the following cross-sectional time-series regression of profit on analyst recommendations:
where |PFT Reportijt | is defined as the 30-day market (ASX 200 Accumulation Index) adjusted return following the publication of each Analyst Research Report; the indicator variable P3 is set equal to one if an observation is from the Pillar 3 reporting period, and zero otherwise; and RATING is a 1,0 indicator of whether the analyst producing the report has a Starmine rating. The variable of interest is the coefficient on P3, which indicates the informational impact of Pillar 3 reporting. If analyst research reports become more informative after the adoption of Pillar 3 reporting, then we would expect the coefficient on P3 to be positive. The variable RATING controls for the potential for rated analysts to produce higher quality research.
Since we are interested in examining the effect of Pillar 3 reporting on analyst report informativeness, rather than the determinants of the informativeness, we use models with research company-bank-year fixed effects. Because of our panel data usage, treating research company-bank-year effects as fixed allows us to abstract the effect of Pillar 3 reporting from equity research firm characteristics (such as research resources and experience), bank attributes (for instance size and location) that remain stable over time. In this way we also control for seasonal differences in quality of analyst output. We follow this analytical framework for all our remaining regressions and report robust tstatistics corrected for heteroskedasticity. In addition, we accompany each OLS regression with a Generalised Linear Model (GLM) specification that allows for the clustering of standard errors at the research company level.
In Table 4 we report the results of our regressions of stock profit estimates following the publication of analyst recommendations. The coefficient on P3 is 0.022 and significant at the one percent level, suggesting that the average stock price change following the release of an equity research firm's report on a bank is significantly weaker after Pillar 3 reporting commences than before Pillar 3. The implication of this finding is that analyst recommendations contain significantly more information post-Pillar 3
reporting, in line with our hypothesis that the availability of regulatory capital and risk information improves the market's reliance on analyst recommendations.
Informativeness and accuracy of analysts' earnings forecasts
To investigate the informativeness of earnings forecasts, we use a fixed effects regression model similar to equation (2) above, with the dependent variable being the absolute 30-day market adjusted return on each bank stock subsequent to the publication of an earnings forecast. In the OLS results, reported in Table 5 , the coefficient on P3 is negative and statistically significant at the one percent level. This shows that the information content of analyst forecasts diminishes after the adoption of Pillar 3
reporting by banks. The inconsistency between this result and our finding on stock recommendations is in line with the literature reporting that earnings forecasts are often not used in recommendations (Bradshaw 2004; Ke and Yu 2009) . The GLM result is statistically insignificant though and readers should calibrate the strength they attach to the finding accordingly.
In Table 6 we report on the results of fixed effect regressions that have as their dependent variable earnings forecast accuracy, which is measured by Normalised Forecast Error, calculated as described in equation (1) 
Informativeness of analyst research reports
Our final pursuit is to examine whether the information content of analysts' research reports responds to the increased availability of regulatory capital and risk management to the market post-Pillar 3 adoption. The results in Table 7 suggest that there is no such effect. The statistically insignificant coefficient on RATING implies that the rating of an analyst does not depict analysts' information advantage before or after the commencement of Pillar 3 reporting. On balance, we conclude from our finding that the informativeness of equity analysts' output only improves in the cases of recommendations and forecast accuracy and not general research that the bank capital and risk management information newly made available through Pillar 3 have valuation relevance.
Conclusions
The empirical evidence in this paper indicates that capital and risk reporting to the market under Pillar 3 of the Basel II and Basel III accords alters the informational advantage of bank equity analysts. After the commencement of Pillar 3 reporting in Australia, equity research analysts seem to have gained access to value relevant information that was hitherto only the preserve of banks and regulators. As a result, we find that the effect of analyst recommendations on stock prices has become more pronounced. Despite some evidence that the information content of earnings forecasts diminishes in the Pillar 3 reporting period, we find that forecast accuracy itself improves.
On balance, we conclude from our finding that the informativeness of equity analysts' output only improves in the cases of recommendations and forecast accuracy and not general research that the bank capital and risk management information newly made available through Pillar 3 have valuation relevance. Ours is then the first paper to show systematic evidence that Pillar 3 is important for information intermediaries such as equity research analysts. As such, regulators are vindicated for espousing the market discipline principles of the Bank for International Settlements' Basel II and Basel III accords.
The preliminary analysis contained in this paper is based on eight Australian Securities Exchange-listed banks. We plan to expand this sample to other countries that have implemented Pillar 3 reporting. At least two advantages may emanate from such an extension of our research. First, we expect to achieve greater generalizability for our results. Second, a multi-country approach would allow us to shed light on whether the specific strategies with which different jurisdictions have introduced Pillar 3 reporting have influenced the relevance of risk and capital information for equity research. 
